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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This appeal is taken pursuant to the authority

of Rules 3

and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and pursuant to
the authority of Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3, paragraph 2(j).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

The issues for the decision of the Court of Appeals are:
1.

Did the trial court err in granting the Defendants1

oral Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the
Plaintiffs' testimony?
2. Are there questions of fact upon which reasonable
minds could differ which preclude the granting of the Directed
Verdict by the trial Court?
3.

Did the Plaintiffs file the suit with the good

faith expectation of prevailing on the merits?
4.

Does the action as filed by the Plaintiffs have

merit?
5. Was the trial court obligated to hear the testimony
of the Defendants before determining that the weight of the
circumstantial evidence was so insufficient as to grant a Motion
for Directed Verdict?
B. Standard of review
1.

For Directed Verdict:

The 1979 case of Asay v^ Rappleye, 593 P.2d 132, in
referring to the standard for judicial review of a directed
verdict, states:

In deciding a motion for directed verdict, the Court
must consider the evidence in the light favorable to the
party against whom it is directed; and unless in so doing
there is no basis upon which reasonable minds acting
fairly thereon could so find the issues as to entitle the
plaintiff to recover, the motion should not be granted . .
. . M. at 133.
The

standard for appellate review of a directed verdict is

again set forth in the case of Management Committee, etc. v.
Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d 896, 897-898 (1982):
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the court
is able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from
the evidence presented.
This Court's standard of review of a directed verdict
is the same as that imposed upon the trial court. We must
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing party, and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the
directed verdict cannot be sustained. Ld. at 897-898.
The Court is also referred to the Utah Court of Appeals case
of Virginia S^ v^ Salt Lake Care Center 741 P.2d 969 (1987) which
cites the above Graystone decision with approval.
2. For Attorney's Fees:
In the 1987 case of Topik v^_ Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, the
Utah Supreme Court examined the issue of awarding attorney's fees
for a "bad faith" filing, and cited to the 1983 case of Cady v.
Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 for authority concerning the standard for
the award of attorney's fees.

Cady states that the court must

find that the claim is both "without merit" Ld. at 151 and
"lacking in good faith." Id.
Therefore, the standard for awarding attorney's fees under
Utah Code Section 78-27-56 states that the claim by the unsuccessful party must be both "without merit" and "lacking in good

faith."
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(a), entitled Motion
for directed verdict; when made, effect states:
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close
of the evidence offerred by an opponent may offer evidence
in the event that the motion is not granted, without
having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent
as if the motion had not been made. A motion for directed
verdict which is not granted is not a waiver of trial by
jury even though all parties to the action have moved for
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall
state the specific ground(s) therefor. The order of the
court granting a motion for a directed verdict is
effective with any assent of the jury.
The pertinent portion of Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code
states as follows:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith .
Finally, Section 78-38-3 of the Utah Code states:
Any person who cuts down or carries off any wood or
underwood, tree or timber, or girdles or otherwise injure
any tree [or] timber on the land of another person, or on
the street or highway in front of any person!s house, town
or city lot, or cultivated grounds, or on the commons or
public grounds of any city or town, or on the street or
highway in front thereof, without lawful authority, is
liable to the owner of such land, or to such city or town,
for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed
thereof in a civil action.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The instant matter was filed by the Plaintiff alleging that
the Defendants

intentionally

and maliciously

poisoned and

destroyed a row of spruce trees growing between the parties1

property.

The Defendants were further accused of trespassing on

the property of the Plaintiffs and of violating the above Utah
statute, Section 78-38-3.
The matter was heard without jury before the Honorable Judge
David Young in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County.

At

the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case, the Plaintiff rested, the
Defendant moved for the entry of a directed verdict and the Court
granted the Motion for Directed Verdict.

Subsequently, the

Defendant moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-27-56 and the Court granted such award of
attorney's fees, but did not make any specific findings of fact
concerning the award of attorney's fees.

This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Plaintiff Vaughn

Keller obtained the subject property

after the death of his father in 1983 (Appeal Transcript of
Trial, referred to hereafter as T., page 1110, lines 22-23) and
the death of his mother in 1984 (T., p. 118, 1. 8-9). Vaughan
Keller's parents lived on the subject property which was a
trailer home located in West Jordan, Utah, since approximately
1960 (T. p. Ill, 1. 7-8) and had a good relationship with their
neighbors, the Defendants (T., p. 27, 1. 18-22;

p. 97, 1. 15-

18; p. 121, 1. 9-22).
However, that "good" relationship deteriorated when the
Keller's Blue Spruce trees which were planted directly between
the parties' trailer homes started to become large and to shade
the Defendant's lawn (T., p. 97, 1. 19-25; p. 98, 1. 1-3, 1. 13-

18, 25; p. 99, 1. 3-11).

In fact, the Defendants became so

concerned with the shading effect of the Blue Spruce trees that
they went to the City of West Jordan to inquire concerning the
existence of a "Sunshine Law" to prohibit the Kellers from
blocking their sun.

(T., p. 99, 1. 12-25; p. 100, 1. 1).

West

Jordan reportedly had no such law, but the Defendants trimmed the
trees to their border nevertheless (T., p. 28, 1. 13-22; p. 100,
1. 2-14; p. 114, 1. 23-25; p. 116, 1. 1-14) and the parties
continued in their controversy.
The Defendant, Mr. Olsen, became so upset regarding the
trees that he severed his relationship with Mr. Keller, the
father of Plaintiff Vaughn Keller, and threatened to take Mr.
Keller to court to stop the trees from blocking their sun (T., p.
100, 1. 15-25).
Mr. Keller, the father, passed away in 1983, supra and Mrs.
Keller, the mother, passed away in 1984, supra, and in early
spring of 1985 the twelve Blue Spruce interspaced with eight
shorter junipers (T., p. 11, 1. 21-23) began to die (T. p. 29, 1.
9-12; p. 118, 1. 9-25; p. 119, 1. 1-3).

Vaughn Keller, the

Plaintiff, noticed at the time that the trees began to die that a
new ditch, running parallel to the trailer and exactly the length
of the trailers (T. p. 122, 1. 1-2, 18) had been dug between the
property of the Kellers and Olsen, which ditch contained a "white
substance." (T. p. 119, 1. 6-19).

Concerned about the dying

trees and the ditch with the white substance, Plaintiff Vaughn
Keller went to the next door trailerhome of the Defendants and
asked to speak to John Olsen, the Defendant. (T. p. 120, 1. 1-3).
Defendant Mrs. Olsen stated that Plaintiff Vaughn Keller could

not speak to her husband, and then stated, as testified by
Plaintiff Vaughn Keller (T. p. 120, 1. 14-25):
(Plaintiff): I asked her, I said, I would like to speak
with John.
(Attorney): Okay.
(Plaintiff): And she said no, in that frame of voice, and
I made eye contact with her and she just glaring at me and
I just stood there and looked at her because it kind of
startled me and she says, for your information, she says,
our lawyer told us we could poison them trees on our side
of the fence and, she says, and you get off our property.
So I just started to back up. I never turned by back to
her. I started backing up and she said, you're a damned
lousey rotten coward too.
Plaintiffs did attempt to analyze the soil with the "white"
residue, but were informed that a soil test was ineffective for
such problem and that any foreign substance put into the soil
would dissipate as quickly as two weeks or as long as six months
(T. p. 46, 1. 4-8)
The property is surrounded by Blue Spruce and Juniper trees
(T. p. 12, 1. 5-15; p. 14, 1. 2-4; p. 17, 1. 19-21, 22-23) and
only the Blue Spruce and Juniper trees directly between the two
properties are dead. In fact, while the remainder of the two
properties is enhanced with lawn and gardens, nothing at all
grows between the two properties where the ditch runs, (T. P. 18,
1. 2-6, 16-22) even though the Defendants Olsen used to grow
cantalopes between the trailers when the Kellers (parents) were
alive (T. p. 90, 1. 5-14).
At the trial of the matter, Plaintiff Vaughn Olsen testified
that in his "right" opinion (T. p. 123, 1. 12) the reason that
the trees died was that the Defendants killed the trees to do
away with the shade (T. p. 123, 1. 15-24; p. 132, 1. 15-24; p.
133, 1. 3-7). Plaintiff Jeanne Keller also testified that in her

opinion, the Defendants Olsen had poisoned the trees with salt
(T. p. 50, 1. 21-25; p. 51, 1. 1-5)
Also testifying at the trial was an expert horticulturist,
Miles Labrum, who stated that he had examined the trees to
ascertain the reason for the death of the trees (T. p. 66, 1. 1517).

Mr, Labrum conclusively stated that the reason for the

death of the trees was not due to insect infestation (T. p. 67,
1. 14-25); was not due to too much or too little water (T. p. 70,
1. 23-25); was not due to too much heat (T. p. 91, 1. 10-22) and
could only

be the result of chemical action (T. p. 72, 1. 2-25;

p. 73, 1. 1-7; p. 94, 1. 21-25; p. 95, 1. 1).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Plaintiffs1 state that the trial court did not properly apply
the standard for the dismissal of an action to this case, for
viewing the evidence objectively, it is certainly likely that
reasonable minds could differ regarding an evaluation of the
evidence before the Court as it existed

at the conclusion of the

Plaintiffs' case in chief. The Motion for Directed Verdict was
improperly

granted

for the totality

of

the direct

and

circumstantial evidence, viewed objectively, certainly weighs in
favor of the Plaintiffs and not against them.
In addition, the award of attorney's fees to the Defendants
pursuant to Utah's "Bad Faith1' statute is improper.

Based upon

the objective evidence under their control and as testified to by
the Court; the expert witness testimony, and the totality of the
circumstantial evidence, the case has merit and was further filed

in good faith by the Plaintiffs with the expectation of recovery
and with no purpose to delay, hinder or defraud the Defendants.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS1 ORAL

MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.
1.

Case Law: The trial court granted the Defendants1

oral Motion for Directed Verdict at the conclusion of the Plaintiffs1 case.

The Findings of Fact signed by the Court simply

state that the Plaintiffs "have failed to adduce evidence proving
what actually caused the death of the Blue Spruce trees" and
that the Plaintiffs "have failed to adduce evidence to prove that
the Olsens intentionally, or otherwise, sought to poison or
destroy the Blue Spruce trees or the lawn belonging to the
Kellers." (Findings of Fact, paragraphs 7 and 8).
The case law in Utah regarding the granting of a directed
verdict specifically states that the trial court must consider
all the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against
whom the motion is directed.

While there are a number of cases

on the topic, the most recent cases found are Asay v. Rappleye,
593 P.2d 132 (1979) which involved the Plaintiff, a building
contractor, who sued the Defendants, homeowners, for work he
undertook on the residence of the Defendants.

The Plaintiff

submitted into evidence a contract for the work to be performed,
testified that the work had been completed, and further testified
that the Defendant expressed her satisfaction with the work which

was performed.
At the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case, the Defendants
moved for the issuance of a directed verdict which the Court
granted.

In reviewing the granting of the motion for directed

verdict, the

Supreme Court observed:

In deciding a motion for directed verdict, the Court
must consider the evidence in the light favorable to the
party against whom it is directed; and unless in so doing
there is no basis upon which reasonable minds acting
fairly thereon could so find the issues as to entitle the
plaintiff to recover, the motion should not be granted . .
In view of the testimony of the plaintiff and his son
that the work was completed . . . and the evidence that
the plaintiff had not been paid therefor, it is apparent
that there was a dispute as to whether the work had been
completed in accordance with the terms of the contract . .
. . Consequently, we are unable to see justification for
the granting of defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
IcL at 133.
In Asay, the Supreme Court found that there was a dispute,
and that reasonable minds could find issues to entitle the
Plaintiff to recover, and that the directed verdict was not well
taken.
In the same vein is the 1982 case of Management Committee,
Etc. v. Graystone Pines, 652 P.2d 896 which also involves
construction matters, but the Plaintiff is suing the builder for
defects in the

building of condominiums.

Plaintiff's purpose of

existence was to maintain the common areas of the condominiums;
leaks developed in the roof; Plaintiff hired an independent
roofer to fix the leaks but the roof continued to leak; the
parties hired their own experts who disagreed on the solution;
and the foundation leaked and the parties various experts again
testified contrary to one another.

The trial court did not let

the matter go to the jury, but granted the Defendant's motion for

directed verdict.
The Supreme Court ruled that:
The foregoing evidence raised substantial issues
of fact as to the alleged defects that could only be
determined by the jury as fact-finder. Therefore, it was
error for the trial judge to rule against plaintiff, as a
matter of law, and to direct a verdict in favor of
defendants. Id. at 899.
And why was it error to rule against the plaintiff?

The

Court set out its standard on directed verdicts as follows:
A directed verdict is only appropriate when the court is
able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable
minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from
the evidence presented.
This Courtfs standard of review of a directed verdict
is the same as that imposed upon a trial court. We must
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
losing pary,, and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that
would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the
directed verdict cannot be sustained. IcL at 897-898.
The Court therefore affirms its previous ruling in Asay,
supra, and confirms that a directed verdict must not be granted
if "reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be
determined from the evidence submitted1' supra.
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals cites the above Graystone
Pines decision with approval in the 1987 case of Virginia S. v.
Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d 969, 971.
2.

Application of the Facts to the Law:

In determining whether the directed verdict should have been
rendered against the Plaintiff in the above matter, the standard
set by ;the Utah appellate Courts, i.e.:
i.
losing party;

examine the evidence in light most favorable to

ii.

must be reasonable basis in:
a. evidence; and
b. inferences

iii.

so that reasonable minds could differ on the facts,

must be adhered to in this matter.
Did the Plaintiff establish evidence and inferences so that
reasonable minds could differ?

The answer must be in the

affirmative in light of the following testimony and proof offered
at the trial by the parties, lay witnesses and an expert witness:
i. The lot was surrounded by Blue Spruce and Juniper
trees which, until early spring of 1985, were all in good health,
ii.

In early spring of 1985, only those twelve Blue

Spruce, interspersed with eight Junipers, which set directly
between the two housetrailers and which directly shaded the
Defendants1 housetrailer, showed signs of discoloration.

At no

time have any of the other Blue Spruce surrounding the lot showed
any signs of death or disease.
iii.

When the Plaintiff asked to see Mr. John Olsen

concerning the discoloration of the trees, Mrs. Olsen, stated to
the Plaintiff, Vaughn Olson, "Our attorney told us we could
poison the trees."
iv. The trees continued to discolor and die, but only
those twenty trees between the trailers and directly next to a
ditch in which was found a "white substance" by the Plaintiffs.
v.

The parents of Vaughn Keller and the Defendants

Olsen were very good friends and neighbors until controversy
arose concerning the growth of the Blue Spruce and the shading it
produced on the Defendant Olsens* property, at which time the

neighbors became rather vitrolic towards one another, even to the
extent that a lawsuit was threatened by the Defendants to take
out the offending shade trees.
vi.

The Plaintiffs1 expert, Miles Labrum, examined the

trees, and concluded that insects did not cause the death of the
trees, water stress did not cause the death of the trees, heat
did not cause the death of the trees, but chemical action did
cause the death of the trees.
vii. A ditch exists between the properties, which ditch
first appeared in early 1985 and which has a "white substance" on
the surface of the ditch.

Prior to the time of the ditch and

the controversy, cantalopes grew well in the location, but at the
present time, and since spring of 1985, nothing grows between the
two trailers.
3.

Conclusion:

It is undeniable that the Plaintiffs

presented sufficient evidence and inferences for reasonable minds
to differ on the facts as determined by the evidence.

The Court

clearly erred in granting the motion for directed verdict, and
the decision must be reversed and remanded for trial.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO

THE DEFENDANTS FOR AN ALLEGED "BAD FAITH" FILING
1.

Case Law:

The leading Utah case establishing the standards under which
to determine an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code
Section 78-27-56 is Cady v^_ Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (1983).
The case involves Plaintiffs who received

from

the

Defendants cash and a written Earnest Money offer on real property.

The Defendants did not complete the s a l e , the P l a i n t i f f s

r e t a i n e d the downpayment of five hundred d o l l a r s and then sued
for the r e a l e s t a t e commission and expenses in r e s e l l i n g the
residence.

The cause of action for expenses in r e s e l l i n g the

residence was dismissed at t r i a l by Plaintiffs' own motion, and
the cause of action for real estate commissions was dismissed by
the Court.

Upon motion by the Defendants, the t r i a l court

then awarded Defendants t h e i r a t t o r n e y ' s fees pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-27-56 for pursuing "meritless" actions and for
s t a t i n g to the t r i a l judge t h a t there would be material issues
presented at the t r i a l when in fact there were no material issues
presented at the t r i a l .
In addressing the issue of the award of a t t o r n e y ' s fees,
the Court f i r s t s t a t e s that the s t a t u t e was not meant to "be
applied to a l l prevailing p a r t i e s in a l l c i v i l s u i t s . " Cady at
151, and that two elements must be present before attorney's fees
are awarded under the "bad faith" statute.

First, the claim must

be "without merit" which the Court defines as "bordering on
f r i v o l i t y , " Id. at 151, meaning "of l i t t l e weight or importance
having no basis in law or fact." W[.
The second determination which must be made is whether the
" p l a i n t i f f ' s conduct in bringing the s u i t was lacking in good
faith" Ld.

And as ably defined by the Court, "good faith" is

(1) An honest belief in the propriety of the a c t i v i t i e s
in q u e s t i o n ; (2) no i n t e n t to take u n c o n s c i o n a b l e
advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of
the fact that the a c t i v i t i e s in question w i l l [ s i c ]
hinder, delay or defraud others.

To establish lack of good faith, one must prove that
one or more of these factors is lacking.

In other words, not only must there be substantial
evidence that the claim was lacking basis in either law or
fact and therefore frivolous, but there must be sufficient
evidence that the unsuccessful party lacked at least one
of the good faith elements heretofore stated.
IcL at 151-152
In 1987, the Utah Court of Appeals cited Cady, supra with
approval in the matter of Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052
(1987) and affirmed

a finding by the trial court that the

defendant's actions in the boundary dispute matter did have some
degree of merit, even if ultimately unsuccessful, and that there
was no justification for an award of attorney's fees.
However, in a case handed down the following day, the Utah
Court of Appeals, again citing Cady, supra, with approval, found
in the matter of Topik v^ Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101 (1987), that
attorney's fees were justified as the defendant lied ("tesfified
falsely") on the stand and presented

a defense which was

partially in "bad faith."
2.

Application of the Facts to the Law:

Again, the standard set forth to justify awarding attorney's
fees to the prevailing party under Cady, supra is:
i.

the case

must be "without

merit," meaning

"bordering on frivolity;" and
ii.

the conduct of the losing party must be lacking in

good faith, which good faith is:
a.

honest belief in the case;

b.

no intent to take unconscionable advantage of

others; and
c. no intent to hinder, delay or defraud.
Thus the question for the instant Court is whether the
Kellers1 case was

without merit and, finding such, was it not

filed in good faith.
Addressing first the issue of the relative merit of the
case, the Plaintiffs plainly testified that:
i.
ii.

The trees began to change color;
A "white substance" was observed in a new ditch

running parallel to the discolored trees;
iii.

Mrs. Olsen directly stated that her attorney told

them they could poison the trees on their side of the property;
iv.

The trees did die, but only those particular trees

located directly between the trailers and not the

other

numerous, same species trees surrounding the property of the
Plaintiff;
v.

An expert testified that the trees were not killed

by insects or overwatering or heat, but by a "chemical
substance."
The weight of the testimony, if only for the purpose of
determining the issue of attorney's fees, indicates that the case
indeed does have merit, is not frivolous, and does have a strong
basis in fact. Viewed objectively, there is the strong likelihood
that the Plaintiffs could prevail before a trier of fact, thus
invalidating any contention that the matter has no merit.
However, for argument's sake, (without admitting such)
assuming that the matter did not have any merit, the next
question

is whether

the matter

is lacking

in good faith.

Plaintiff Vaughn Olsen testified that in his "right" supra
opinion, the Defendants killed the trees and Plaintiff Jeanne
Keller also testified that it was her belief that the trees were
poisoned by the Defendants.

There is no testimony of any nature

which proves or alleges that the Plaintiffs intended to take
unconscionable advantage of others or that they attempted to
hinder, delay or defraud anyone.
Thus, not one of the three above-mentioned elements of good
faith were proved lacking, and the standard for the award of
attorneyfs fees is not met.
Without question, the action was filed in good faith by the
Plaintiffs who believed and continue to believe that the matter
does have merit, and that there are no grounds whatsoever for the
granting of attorney's fees in this matter.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs pray that the Court set aside the Order of
Dismissal and the award of attorney's fees, and remand this
matter to the trial court for a new hearing.
Respectfully submitted this

day July, 1990.
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